Eroding the assets of citizenship? From broadcast to broadband by Harvey, Sylvia & Ala-Fossi, Marko
Eroding the Assets of Citizenship? From Broadcast to Broadband 
Sylvia Harvey 
School of Media and Communication 
University of Leeds 
Leeds LS2 9JT 
UK 
& Marko Ala-Fossi 
School of Communication, 
Media and Theatre (CMT) 
33014 University of Tampere 
Finland 
s.m.harvey@leeds.ac.uk marko.ala-fossi@uta.fi 
Keywords: European spectrum policy, digital terrestrial television, broadcasting, mobile 




The promise of convergence and the maturing internet appear to create arenas of 
communicative plenty but, instead of the end of spectrum scarcity, we are witnessing a new 
challenge of ‘coexistence’ and fierce competition over spectrum between the broadcasters 
and mobile telecom providers. Some European countries have already decided on further 
reductions in the broadcast spectrum, though the vast majority disagreed with the mobile 
industries’ proposal at the World Radiocommunication Conference in November 2015 that 
the entire UHF band should in future be shared by mobile broadband and broadcasting. This 
article explores the proposition that broadcasting requires adequate spectrum in order to 
deliver the information and cultural assets that are vital for citizenship, at a cost likely to 




The promise of convergence and the maturing internet create arenas of communicative plenty 
but, instead of the end of spectrum scarcity, we are witnessing a challenge of ‘coexistence’ 
which in practice entails fierce competition over spectrum between the broadcasters and 
mobile telecom providers. Initially, the European Union, advised by its Radio Spectrum 
Policy Programme, identified the 800 MHz band as the most suitable digital dividend to be 
given up by broadcasters to the new mobile interests.  
However, at the World Radiocommunications Conference in 2012 (WRC12) this 
European consensus was challenged by a counter proposal - that the 700 MHz band should be 
re-allocated for mobile use.  This unexpected raid on broadcasting territory was successfully 
advocated by other interests at the Conference and supported by the votes of countries in the 
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Middle East and Africa – also members of the International Telecommunications Union/ITU, 
Region 1. Moreover the European consensus began to be broken down as some member 
states of the European Union identified additional spectrum in the 700MHz part of the Ultra 
High Frequency band (UHF 470 -790 MHz) to be transferred from broadcasting to mobile 
use in their own countries. For example, Finland proposed this reallocation in 2012, followed 
by the United Kingdom (UK) in 2014 (Ofcom, 2014a).  
As a consequence of the WRC12 proposals digital terrestrial television broadcasters 
in Europe now faced the loss of both the 800 and the 700MHz bands. And the mobile 
operators then started to push hard for the reallocation of the entire UHF band, including its 
lower reaches (GSMA, 2015a). From the point of view of the broadcasters what had been 
presented by the mobiles as a positive proposal, put forward in the name of ‘coexistence’ and 
the ‘co-primary’ role of the two industries, would – if put into effect – dramatically reduce 
the scope for both private and public digital terrestrial television (DTT). Thus at the most 
recent World Radio Conference in November 2015 (WRC15) the most intense conflict 
revolved around the lower part of the UHF band - the 470-694MHz portion - since this is the 
only remaining part of the spectrum dedicated solely for DTT after the loss of the 800 and 
700 MHz bands.  
The context of this development includes at least three different but inter-related 
factors. On the macro-level, this is about globalization. So far, national governments and 
regulators have protected European public broadcasters, partly because broadcasting has been 
seen to meet the vital social, cultural and political functions necessary to a democratic nation 
state. In addition, European governments have used broadcasters as tools of their industrial 
policy projects, for example the development of digital television, and as partners for their 
domestic electronics manufacturers - for example Nokia. When compared to Africa or the 
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Middle East, Europe was also developing new communications services, so the pressure for 
change was originating from within Europe and not being imposed on it.  
But European countries appeared increasingly less able to dominate the shaping of 
WRC spectrum policy goals for ITU Region 1 (Europe, the Middle East and Africa) (El-
Moghazi et al., 2014). The African and Middle Eastern countries, working with the mobile 
industries, have developed plans for spectrum use diverging from Europe’s priorities. For 
most of them, the 700 MHz band was their first digital dividend, as the 800 MHz band had 
already been allocated for other uses such as national defense (El-Moghazi et al., 2014). 
Moreover these countries have an especially strong social and economic interest in 
supporting their own development by improving mobile broadband services. The number of 
existing broadcast TV operations is smaller than in Europe and the investment needed for 
mobile broadband infrastructure is relatively low by comparison. From a European 
perspective, a possible irony here is that two of the largest makers of telecommunications 
equipment - striving for harmonised world-wide spectrum allocations for mobile use and for 
global markets for their devices - still have their headquarters in Europe. (Scott and Jolly, 
2015; Bocquet, 2014; Nokia, 2014; Ericsson, 2014) An additional or perhaps principal reason 
for pressing to reallocate the 700 MHz band for mobile use in ITU Region 1 is that this band 
is already in mobile broadband use in ITU Regions 2 and 3 (the Americas and the Asia-
Pacific). And global harmonisation of spectrum allows economies of scale. 
A second factor, operating at what we might call the intermediate or ‘meso’ level of 
analysis concerns the role of supranational responses and the pressures that these may exert 
on the globalization process. For example, although the WRC12 decision on the 700 MHz 
band went against the views of the European Commission’s own senior advisory body, the 
European Spectrum Policy Programme (RSPP), the Commission (EC) did not fight against 
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this but quickly adapted a new policy approach. This was perhaps not surprising, as the 
Commission had already recognised the need to identify a second digital dividend during the 
early phase of drafting the RSPP report. Thus the EC commissioned a report on the future use 
of the whole UHF band (Lamy, 2014), organized a public consultation on whether it should 
follow the recommendations of this report and finally, prior to WRC15, made a formal 
proposal to the member states. This entailed reallocating the 700 MHz band for mobile across 
the EU while keeping the lower part of the UHF band in broadcast use,  just as the Lamy 
report had suggested  (EC, 2015).  
Interestingly, even though the member states generally agreed with the Commission 
about the future use of UHF, they refused to accept the proposal as a formal joint position of 
the European Union (EU), primarily to keep spectrum policy strictly within their national 
competence (Valero, 2015). There is tension between some member states and the 
Commission on this issue, not least because the new EC President of 2014, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, wanted the EU to take over the ‘management of radio waves’ in order to promote 
economic growth in Europe.  
It can be argued that the EU has not been openly hostile to public service broadcasting 
(PSB). However, the combination of its growing support for market-focused media policies 
and a perceived need to protect the economic interests of commercial enterprises has already 
resulted in severe restrictions for European PSBs (Venturelli, 1998; Brevini, 2013a, 2013b). 
As the European commercial broadcasters wanted the EU to limit the expansion of PSB 
broadcast services, the result was the EU’s Amsterdam Protocol (1997: 17). This recognizes 
the importance of PSB for democracy and culture and the right of member states to define the 
PSB remit and to finance public broadcasting from public funds – as long as this funding 
does not distort competition. In other words, the official EU protection could be seen as a 
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golden cage allowing the formerly dominant paradigm of PSB to be seen as a deviation from 
the commercial norm.  
Following the creation of this Protocol various European newspaper publishers 
became concerned about PSB activities on the internet. These they saw as a severe threat to 
their own electronic news business. This time the complaints from the commercial industry 
led to the Communication on State Aid to Public Service Broadcasting (European Union, 
2009), which limits PSB expansion into new media by requiring an ex ante test for any 
significant new service (Brevini, 2013a). Now the European PSBs find themselves in the 
middle of a third round of contest against powerful commercial industries – with the PSBs 
now perhaps surprisingly allied with the terrestrial commercial broadcasters – as the mobile 
industries are lobbying the EU and its member states to support the reallocation of more UHF 
spectrum for mobile broadband use. Since the EU is also desperately trying to find ways to 
accelerate the economic growth of the whole region, its policy decisions on the future of UHF 
band could have been a severe blow to public broadcasting. However, the Commission 
proposal for WRC-15 to reallocate the 700 MHz band to mobiles but to keep the remaining 
UHF band for digital terrestrial television (DTT)  can be seen as a pragmatic compromise, 
accepted not only by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) but also by the African 
Telecommunication Union (ATU) (EC, 2015; EBU, 2015a). 
The last of our key contextual factors can be seen in operation at a micro or nation 
state level of analysis. Under the impact of a wider neoliberal frame of reference, most of the 
European countries are arguably in a gradual transition from what Jessop calls Keynesian 
welfare states to Schumpeterian competition states, focusing more on innovation and national 
competitiveness than on citizen welfare (2002; Pelkonen, 2008). As a part of this process, not 
only social policy but also media policy and spectrum policy are increasingly subordinated to 
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economic policy. The continuing importance of broadcasting in creating social and cultural 
value tends to be neglected, and social judgments are made primarily from an economic 
standpoint (Jessop, 2002; Delaere and Cullell-March, 2014). Perhaps the most striking 
example is Finland. It was the first EU member state which decided as early as September 
2012 to clear broadcasting from the 700 MHz band and to reallocate it for mobile broadband. 
In October 2015 it was also the only EU member state to support the reallocation of the entire 
UHF band with co-primary status for mobile use (GSMA, 2015b; Pursiainen, 2015).   
At the same time that Finland is suffering from a prolonged economic recession and 
rapidly increasing public debt, it is also investing over €100 million in research and 
development for 5G - the next generation of mobile broadband technology. An early release 
of new mobile spectrum is expected to support the project. It has also been suggested that a 
steady supply of additional spectrum made available for auction is designed to hold back the 
prices paid, thus assisting mobile operators in investing in new network infrastructure and 
equipment (Lindén, 2012: 231; Sims et al., 2015: 197-199). This it is hoped will directly 
improve the Finnish economy as well as indirectly supporting national competitiveness in the 
global market.  
In the sections that follow we combine general comment with specific examples from 
Finland and from the United Kingdom. 
 
The battle for spectrum (1): market pressures  
 
Spectrum is the basis of all mobile connectivity. However, the frequencies below 1 GHz - for 
example the entire UHF band - are among the most desired by all industries, because they 
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provide possibilities for better in-building penetration with relatively small antennae and 
larger coverage areas. According to Galperin (2004a), one of the most important reasons for 
strong government support for an accelerated transition to digital television, on both sides of 
the Atlantic, was that analogue TV switch-off would release spectrum from broadcast use for 
mobile industries. By 2013 most EU member states had completed the switchover to DTT. 
But the implementation that would see mobile broadband services enjoying the digital 
dividend of the 800 MHz band has been slower than the EU expected (for details see Ala-
Fossi and Lax 2016 in this issue).  
Nation states are expected to gain economic benefit from the reallocation of DTT 
spectrum for mobile broadband in at least four different ways. The first and most direct 
involves the injection of cash, coming as revenues from spectrum auctions, as the publicly 
owned frequency spaces are sold or leased to privately owned telecom companies. Although 
the frequencies remain the same however they are used, their value is dependent on both the 
availability of spectrum and on the number of potential users in the area. This is why the 
spectrum auction revenues in countries with a large area and small population like Finland 
tend to be relatively modest. But in countries with a large potential market the competition 
over spectrum can lead to very high auction prices and even spectrum overvaluation.1 The 
more the operators pay for the spectrum, the less they can invest in the actual mobile 
networks and services (Lindén, 2012; Sims et al., 2015).  
The second, more indirect improvement to the economy of a nation - and one which 
also has profound social dimensions – comes if the reallocated and auctioned spectrum 
improves the availability of cheaper and faster broadband, especially in the most sparsely 
inhabited and rural parts of the country. Mobile broadband using lower frequencies (like the 
UHF band) with large coverage areas is usually the more cost-efficient way of building the 
infrastucture for new services in these areas - when compared to fixed networks. 
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The third factor is related to spectrum availability and the speed with which spectrum 
can be released from other uses. The larger the supply of the available spectrum, the lower 
the price the operators have to pay for it. And the sooner a new part of the spectrum can be 
taken into mobile use in a particular nation, the more this can benefit manufacturers like 
Nokia and the mobile telecom operators within that country. Such companies are already 
investing in research for the development of new standards like 5G, using higher frequencies 
above 6 GHz, and for new services like the Internet of Things (IoT). Such services can be 
located on the bands released from other use, thus innovating and creating more economic 
activity and more new jobs. This way a policy aimed at smooth and early release of spectrum 
can become a basis for national competitive advantage. 
Finally, it is widely assumed that better and faster broadband services and possible 
European leadership in the global mobile technologies would lure new investments and boost 
the economies not only of the most competitive member states but of the whole European 
Union. This is perhaps the greatest promise of the next generation networks (NGN) (Bocquet, 
2014). The increasing use of ICT and network technologies have certainly improved 
productivity in many areas, and a Swedish study - supported by one of the leading mobile 
network technology companies - suggests that doubling the broadband speed would lead to 
an additional 0.3% growth in national gross domestic product (GDP) (Rohman and Bohlin, 
2012; Ericsson, 2011)  
All the direct, indirect and potential economic benefits described above are the carrot, 
which the mobile industries are understandably using to lobby and to shape national and 
supranational policies in their own interests. It is no wonder that the European states, striving 
to improve their competitiveness and to create economic growth through new technologies 
are very interested in reallocating public resources - including spectrum space - into what 
some see as activities that are more economically promising than broadcasting. However, in 
10 
 
case the carrot does not seem to be enough to make the public policies change the mobile 
industries have also a stick in their selection of methods. They can remind Europe that it has 
already ‘…fallen behind other developed regions in the mobile Internet race, putting the 
future of mobile and broadcasting as well as the wider economy at risk’ (GSMA, 2015a). 
It is certainly the case that there has been significant growth in mobile broadband use 
in recent years, and the mobile industry is convinced that an increase in consumer demand for 
mobile video services in particular will drive an (almost) exponential growth of mobile data 
traffic. Based on extrapolation from recent trends, the International Telecommunication 
Union has estimated that mobile broadband would need, globally, at least 1340 MHz of 
spectrum to meet demand by 2020 (ITU, 2013). However, experts at the EBU have severely 
challenged both the input assumptions and the mathematical approach of the ITU report, 
arguing that the report is flawed and that its erroneous conclusions should not be relied upon 
in the debate about the spectrum needs of international mobile telephony (IMT) (Beutler and 
Ratkaj, 2014).  
Interestingly enough, in his report for the European Commission on the future use of 
the UHF band (consisting of a total of 320 MHz of spectrum) Pascal Lamy did not refer to 
the ITU estimates. Instead he relied on mobile data traffic forecasts provided by Ericsson, a 
company with its headquarters in Sweden (Lamy, 2014). According to the latest Ericsson 
Mobility Report, there has been a 55 per cent growth in all global mobile data traffic between 
the first quarters of 2014 and 2015. The company still predicts –  just as it did two years 
earlier – a 45 per cent compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in global mobile data from 
2014, which amounts to a tenfold increase by 2020. Ericsson expects mobile data traffic 
growth to be faster than average (by a factor of eleven) in the Asia-Pacific region, and also in 
Central Europe, Middle East and Africa, but slightly slower in Western Europe (rising by a 
factor of nine). Currently about 45 per cent of all mobile data traffic is video, and Ericsson 
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believes that video use will continue to grow annually at about 55 per cent resulting in a 
thirteen–fold increase by 2020. (Lamy, 2014; Ericsson, 2015).  
The growth of mobile video is important for the mobile sector as it is recognized as 
one of the profitable ‘data hungry applications’ - along with internet browsing and file 
downloads - in those parts of the world with rising smart phone penetration. In its 2014 report 
on the mobile economy GSMA noted that worldwide mobile revenue growth is expected to 
slow to 2.9 per cent per annum for the next five years (2015-2020), down from a growth 
figure of 5 per cent per in the previous the five years. This forecast is accompanied by 
warnings to regulators and government tax departments not to produce disincentives for new 
investment in the sector - with particular reference to Europe where ‘…Roaming price caps 
are estimated by the European Commission to have reduced revenues by €15 billion by the 
end of 2012’ (2014: 26).  
There is also an uneasy relationship between mobile video and broadcasting since the 
increasingly popular delivery of moving pictures and sounds via fixed or mobile broadband 
appears to challenge the future prospects of broadcasting. If broadcasting is like the fixed 
price meal – offering at its best good quality and good value at the same low price to all - 
then mobile video is the more expensive ‘à la carte’ offer: choose what you want when you 
want it, but it will cost you more. We are living through a period of rapid change in the take-
up of mobile video, video on demand etc., though traditional linear TV viewing seems still to 
be popular. In the UK, for example, average daily viewing per person was down from 4 hours 
in 2012 to 3 hours and 40 minutes two years later in 2014; a reduction of around 8 per cent 
(Ofcom, 2013; 2015: 145). The more personalized, catch-up services offered by broadcasters 
are relatively more expensive to distribute than live broadcasts, though many viewers will 
remain unaware of this. A BBC Trust report of 2013 indicated that iPlayer viewing 
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represented under 3 per cent of all BBC viewing but that its delivery cost was six times more 
than the delivery cost per viewing hour of linear TV (2013: 22 and 39).  
 
The battle for spectrum (2): public policy 
  
In the United Kingdom, during this period, the companies providing fixed and mobile 
broadband seem to have been the most effective lobbyists in the process of developing public 
policy, arguing the case for the beneficial impact of new mobile services on the national 
economy. By contrast the civic, social and cultural arguments that can in principle be 
advanced by public service broadcasters (and their listeners and viewers) seem to have been 
less clearly presented and certainly less influential. A brief revue of strategy documents 
issued by the key Ministry, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), and by the 
regulatory body, the Office of Communications (Ofcom) shows both how important the 
expansion of fixed and mobile broadband was thought to be and how significant the re-
allocation of spectrum has been in that process.  
It may also be worth noting that the budgets and resources of both the Ministry and 
the regulator, Ofcom, reduced during the period 2012 - 2015 as a consequence of  
Government policy in the wake of the banking crisis of 2008. At its peak, the cost of British 
taxpayer support for the banks was estimated at £1,162 billion, reducing to around £122 
billion by March 2014. By contrast, all expenditure on UK public services in 2014 was £714 
billion (National Audit Office: 2015; HM Treasury 2014: 70-72). The cost of protecting the 
banks continued to cast a long shadow over other kinds of public expenditure and, more 
generally, over political debate and the setting of public priorities. 
A key objective for the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition on entering 
Government in 2010 was to make radical reductions in public spending, against the 
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background of the enormous bank-related commitments noted above. Two examples of the 
reduction in resources at public agencies that might be expected to develop public interest 
policies for communication are noted here. Firstly the staffing levels at DCMS were reduced 
by just under 20 per cent in 2012 and secondly Ofcom was required to reduce its overall 
budget by a total of 28 per cent over the four years  2011 – 2015 (DCMS, 2013: 27 and 184; 
Ofcom, 2012a: 10).2 It would be unwise to assume that fewer staff means less attention to 
public interest issues. Nonetheless the pressure on public posts may have led to a sharper 
focus on the importance of generating additional revenue for the Treasury and possibly to a 
greater sympathy for income-generating spectrum auctions. In addition the general climate of 
policy shifted towards support for innovative and job-creating industries and such support 
could itself be seen as consistent with public interest principles. However, political 
disagreement continues to revolve around the extent and nature of this shift and, as our 
introduction has suggested, changes in elite policy-making could include support for 
economic interests at the expense of social and cultural welfare.  
The Ministerial Foreword to The UK Spectrum Strategy of 2014 emphasizes that 
spectrum is ‘worth over £50bn a year to the UK’ and proposes to ‘double its annual 
contribution to the economy by 2025’. The societal benefit that derives from spectrum-
dependent ‘live entertainment and broadcasting’ is noted, but priority is given to a system for 
valuing spectrum that ‘keeps economic value as its bedrock’. There is an attendant 
reassurance that social costs and benefits would be taken into ‘proper account’ but the 
‘bedrock’ metaphor remains the dominant image. Interestingly this document also refers to 
satellite services as ‘not an easy technology … development cycles are longer than for most 
terrestrial services and it is important for regulators to take a long term view, even if in the 
short term this leads to spectrum not being fully utilized. (DCMS, 2014: 4-5; 12-13; 49)  
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This rationale in defence of long term thinking would also be welcomed by the terrestrial 
broadcasters though the Government’s perspective is clearly to see the need for change in 
respect of mobile and wireless data as ‘high’ when the need for DTT is only ‘medium’  
(DCMS, 2014: 22). 
Drawing on a 2012 consultancy report UK Spectrum Strategy also presents some 
illuminating detail on the respective economic value of mobile services and broadcasting. 
The former were believed to be worth 60 per cent and the latter 20 per cent of the total 
economic value of spectrum use in the UK, while mobile services supported a supply chain 
with annual revenues of around £20 billion and some 75,000 jobs and the broadcasting 
supply chain was estimated to be worth around £16 billion and to support 40,000 jobs 
(DCMS, 2014: 15).  
 In a policy world where there had been lack of consistency – for example various 
public services including Defence enjoyed Crown immunity and were not therefore required 
to apply for spectrum licences - the 2014 document expressed an admirable intention to seek 
a more consistent methodology for assessing the value of spectrum to the UK. In pursuit of 
this objective the Department invited a panel of experts to assist, taking account especially of 
the need to incorporate ‘social value’ into the process. The group reported their findings in 
July of the following year, in the wake of a General Election. The report, Incorporating 
Social Value into Spectrum Allocation Decisions, was published a few months later in 
November 2015.  It would be premature to assess what impact this might have on longer term 
spectrum decisions affecting either DTT or the mobile services. 
While the 2014 DCMS strategy document was an attempt at creating some policy 
breathing space, much water had already flowed under the bridge (Ofcom, 2009; 2012b). In 
particular the UK had already experienced the transfer of the 800MHz frequencies to the 
mobile sector. The regulator Ofcom had auctioned these licences in 2013. Government and 
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regulator had both been aware that this re-allocation could cause interference with digital 
television signals and since 2012 was the year of final switchover from analogue to digital 
television transmission such interference would have to be avoided or remedied. The 
problems had also been noted in the consumer and civil society sector (Voice of the Listener 
and Viewer, 2012)  As indicated above the UK had been an early adopter of the 800MHz 
clearances in order to accommodate the new 4G mobile devices (Ofcom, 2012b: 4). 
Ofcom’s own report had indicated that as many as 2.3 million households could be 
adversely affected by loss or distortion of their TV signal (2012b). The Government had 
therefore committed financial support to provide remedies where necessary in respect of 
detriment caused by a change in public policy (DCMS, 2012). Those mobile operators who 
were successful in obtaining the new spectrum were required to fund and deliver a help 
scheme; initially referred to as ‘MitCo’ and then ‘at800’ (2013). At the time of writing at800 
was still operating in the UK though the number of homes adversely affected was understood 
to be less than the original estimate (IP&TV News, 2014). 
Sensing the way the wind was blowing from the unexpected WRC12 proposal to 
release additional spectrum for mobiles, Ofcom took an in principle decision to reallocate the 
700 MHz band, also, from broadcasting to mobile (2014a and 2014b). WRC15 confirmed the 
international decision to release this band though Ofcom is unlikely to announce an auction 
date in the UK until the broadcasters have done more of the onerous planning work required 
to re-locate DTT transmissions. Freeview, the main DTT platform for free-to-air television in 
the UK and present in some 75 per cent of homes, has maintained a discreet silence since 
WRC15 but must clearly be relieved that it lives to fight another day with relatively secure 
access to the lower UHF band at least until 2023 (Ofcom, 2014c; Digital UK, 2015). 
However, it is not yet clear what cost and disruption may be experienced by European 
viewers in the wake of the WRC15 decision to move DTT providers out of the 700MHz 
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band. A significant number of homes will currently rely upon free-to-air transmissions in this 
band. In the UK alone Freeview noted an Ofcom estimate of up to 20 million homes 
adversely affected by the move and expressed concern that some of these homes would be 
faced with loss of ‘all their channels’ and the need for ‘a more complex manual re-tune’ 
(Freeview, 2014: 2-3). In Europe it is estimated that 230 million viewers – nearly half the 
population of the EU (46 per cent) rely upon DTT and could be adversely affected by the 
frequency migration (Ratkaj, 2014). For the providers the biggest worry will be the loss of 
viewers in the ensuing confusion and those who have relied upon a free service and a roof top 
aerial may think they have no option but to change to a monthly payment system with a cable 
or satellite provider.  
Nonetheless, the major concern that DTT broadcasters might be deprived of any 
suitable frequencies has, since the WRC15 decision, become at least a delayed concern. It 
seems that the DTT providers can rely on the spectrum they need at least until 2023 when the 
issue will be reconsidered by WRC (EBU, 2015b). 
 
European broadcasters: dead ends and open doors 
 
For nearly a century national public service broadcasters, as well as commercial broadcasters 
more generally, have been protected by their technological distinctiveness along with a set of 
normative assumptions about the social, cultural and political importance of broadcasting. In 
Europe the already mentioned Amsterdam Protocol, included as part of the main European 
Treaty since 1997, is one example of the legal recognition and financial support afforded to 
PSB in particular  (Galperin, 2004b).  
However, as a result of extensive political, economic and technological changes, 
broadcasting now finds itself one of the ‘…smallest players in their new pool of competitors’ 
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(Accenture, 2015: 4). The advent and rapid expansion of spectrum-hungry mobile broadband 
and the growth of internet protocol television (IPTV), as well as the downgrading of 
arguments about the information requirements of citizenship have - taken together - left 
broadcasters fighting for political recognition and support. This is the case despite the evident 
and continuing popularity of television and despite the high political and social significance 
of - for example - pre-election and election night coverage; a recent example being the 
general election broadcasts in Finland and in the UK in 2015. The importance of live 
coverage of these events, as of major sporting competitions, national celebrations and natural 
(or man-made) disasters serves as a reminder of the importance of linear and live TV even at 
a time when the medium is seen by some as redundant. Moreover the fact that funding 
arrangements for European PSBs include provision for making programmes as well as 
transmitting signals reminds us of the value of original drama, comedy and children’s 
programmes drawn from and returning to diverse national audiences. While the provision of 
well-resourced and well-researched documentary and factual programmes - dealing with 
current affairs and operating under the banner of impartiality - remain a key asset for 
informed citizenship. 
The emergence of a new organisation the Future of Broadcast Television, bringing 
together manufacturers, broadcasters and network operators from all over the world (China to 
Brazil, Russia to Europe, Korea to the United States) and linking public and commercial 
providers indicates that the medium intends to fight not just for survival, but for a place at the 
high table of industrial innovation and research (FOBTV, 2015). From a contrasting global 
perspective, the economic value of the broadcast industry in Europe may be seen to constitute 
a fraction of the value of telecommunication businesses or of the so called ‘super-platforms’ 
like Amazon, Google and Facebook (Plum, 2013; Accenture, 2015). Though broadcasting 
also has a distinctive economic value deriving from its often pivotal role in the creative 
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industries, rich in just that kind of intellectual property generation that Europe has regarded 
as one of its strengths. 
Conscious of these issues and aware of the specific conflict over spectrum resources 
the European Commission attempted an initiative to bring the competing parties together. 
The aim was to reach an agreement that would be good for the European continent as a 
whole. Pascal Lamy, former European Commissioner and subsequently Director of the World 
Trade Organisation was invited to chair a ‘high level group’ consisting of industry 
representatives, though with a rather striking absence of citizen or consumer interests. The 
group of 19 executives from the mobile and broadcasting sectors met over a period of six 
months from January to June of 2014. Unfortunately no agreement was reached and the 
deadlock was specifically about spectrum allocation issues (2014: 6). Consequently the report 
was submitted in the name of the Chair, not the group, though some useful fragments were 
skillfully extracted from the process: the facts that all parties agreed upon. 
There were some positive words from Lamy about broadcasting. In most member 
countries DTT constituted the ‘backbone’ of the European audio-visual model. Citizens were 
provided with ‘…a broad range of quality programming, free at the point of access’; a 
universally available service delivered ‘…major public policy objectives such as cultural 
diversity and media pluralism’ and the debate about the future of the UHF band was ‘not 
about sacrificing culture for the sake of the digital economy’. Following a brisk review of 
changes in technology and viewer habits in the use of both mobiles and televisions, the 
sometimes loose talk of convergence was rejected: ‘I conclude that convergence of both 
platforms is not on the practical policy agenda yet’ and mobile standards were ‘not currently 
capable of supporting broadcasting to mass audiences on big screens’ (2014: 3-4). 
Nonetheless there was an urgent need to recognise mobile’s fast expansion and current 
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capacity problems, as well as the speed with which new discoveries might resolve these. This 
led to the catchphrase of the report, the so-called ‘20-25-30’ solution to the current impasse.  
Lamy offered neither a dead end nor an entirely open door to either party – by 2020 
(or a couple of years before or after that) broadcasters would have vacated the 700 MHz band 
in favour of the mobiles but there would be ‘reassurances for the sustainable development of 
terrestrial broadcasting in spectrum below the 700 MHz band’. The year 2025 would see a 
major review of needs and resources for both industries, and terrestrial broadcasting would be 
‘an important platform until 2030’ (2014: 6-7). For mobiles the change points would not 
come soon enough and for broadcasters and audiences the year 2030 might sound like 
Armageddon and the end of DTT.  
However - and as already indicated - there was encouraging news from WRC15. 
Sufficient suitable spectrum would be provided to DTT broadcasters at least until the long-
term review process begins again in 2023 – and possibly before. Within this window of 
opportunity it will be for terrestrial broadcasters, including public service broadcasters, to 
persuade their audiences that these services are vital and necessary both in reflecting and 
sometimes shaping everyday culture and in the way that they address the key and crisis points 




Both mobile and broadcasting interests have produced small mountains of expensively 
generated statistics designed to show that each makes a greater economic contribution to 
society than the other (GSMA, 2014; Aetha, 2014). But not very much attention seems to 
have been given to the interests and wishes of the users. In respect of broadcasting the four 
main replacement candidates are cable, satellite, internet service providers and mobile 
20 
 
telephony. The current costs of commercial cable and subscription packages can be fairly 
easily researched but there is limited information on the likely costs of online and mobile 
delivery in the event that either of these providers becomes an important delivery mechanism 
for the daily four hours of television use including the big live events that attract very large 
audiences.  
By contrast the various European publics are aware of the monthly cost of supporting 
a national public broadcaster, funded directly by the viewers or indirectly from the public 
purse. It seems unlikely that the relatively small part of this cost that covers the delivery of 
programmes into the home via DTT could be matched by future fixed or mobile, broadband 
providers relaying television services. Broadcasters and Governments must now assist 
viewers in gaining a realistic picture of the cost of delivery of a national service relayed via 
mobile or online providers. 
But, in concluding, there is clearly more at stake in the spectrum debate than the cost 
of receiving television services. The European Community has had the privilege of devoting 
spectrum and other public resources to the development of (mainly) popular and impartial 
systems of public service broadcasting and to providing a platform for exploring political 
conflicts and supporting indigenous cultures, languages and minorities. This has been the 
case in many but not all European countries. We argue that - while the development of new 
mobile technologies and markets is important – universally available broadcasting services 
must also be supported due to their actual or potential role in the exercise of citizenship and 
the working of democracy. In a very different era the outgoing President of the United States, 
George Washington, captured something of the importance to society of access to good 
quality information gathered carefully and from a full range of sources: 
Promote then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general 
diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of government gives force to 
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